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The	‘Exit	from	Brexit’	illusion:	why	the	Liberal
Democrats	cannot	capture	the	48%
The	days	of	the	2010	coalition	seem	a	long	way	away	for	the	Liberal	Democrats.	Is
opposition	to	Brexit	a	ticket	back	to	relevance?	Can	the	party	make	inroads	into	the
core	Remain	vote?	David	Cutts	and	Andrew	Russell	explain	why	this	strategy,
although	logical,	is	unlikely	to	succeed.
Brighton	was	the	focal	point	for	the	latest	attempt	by	the	Liberal	Democrats	to	make
the	party	relevant	in	British	politics	once	more.	In	the	midst	of	consistent	flat-lining
party	and	personal	polling	rating,	Sir	Vince	Cable	sought	to	rally	his	flagging	party,	using	his	Leader’s	speech	at	the
Liberal	Democrat	conference	to	redefine	their	identity	as	a	‘movement	for	moderates’	and	to	condemn	those	with	an
‘erotic	spasm’	for	Leaving	the	European	Union.	Leaving	aside	the	fluffed	lines,	disquiet	over	Sir	Vince’s	decision	to
retain	the	leadership	until	Brexit	is	completed	(whenever	that	may	be!),	and	open	disagreement	at	all	levels	of	the
party	about	the	coalition	legacy,	it	is	a	good	time	to	remind	ourselves	of	the	monumental	challenge	facing	the	Liberal
Democrats.
The	consequences	of	losing	the	third	party	mantle	to	the	SNP
The	heady	days	of	the	2010	coalition,	when	the	third	party	held	the	Deputy	Premiership	and	five	cabinet	posts,	seem
a	long	way	away	for	the	Liberal	Democrats.	A	party	that	had	always	bemoaned	its	lack	of	media	coverage	found	itself
outside	the	spotlight	due	to	their	exceedingly	poor	electoral	performance.	The	parliamentary	rules	of	the	game
compounded	their	sudden	exclusion.	As	leaders	of	the	third	party,	Paddy	Ashdown,	Charles	Kennedy,	Menzies
Campbell,	and	Nick	Clegg	all	benefitted	from	the	convention	of	being	able	to	ask	weekly	questions	of	the	country’s
leader	in	Prime	Minister’s	Questions.	Suddenly,	after	2015,	this	reward	went	to	the	SNP.	Tim	Farron,	and	since	2017
Vince	Cable,	had	to	be	content	with	being	called	to	challenge	David	Cameron	or	Theresa	May	only	once	a	month.
Within	a	short	space	of	time,	the	Liberal	Democrats	had	retreated	not	only	from	the	inner	circle	of	government	but
become	virtually	invisible	in	the	public	performance	of	Westminster	politics.	They	had	become	a	party	on	the	margins
of	political	life	in	Britain.
The	leadership	of	the	party	has	maintained	that	the	UK’s	imminent	departure	from	the	European	Union	constitutes
the	arena	in	which	the	Liberal	Democrats	could,	and	should,	fight	their	existential	battle.	The	issue	they	can	utilize	to
cut	through	to	the	wider	electorate.	Early	signs	might	have	enabled	the	party	to	glimpse	the	difficulty	here.	The
party’s	traditional	Europhile	outlook	was	surprisingly	at	odds	with	many	of	its	traditional	voters.
The	Liberal	Party	had	protected	itself	from	the	danger	of	wipeout	from	Labour	after	universal	suffrage	by	clinging	on
to	pockets	of	support	in	peripheral	areas.	Voters	in	the	Highlands	and	Islands	of	Scotland	and	some	agrarian
communities	of	the	south-west	and	rural	Wales	remained	loyal	to	the	Liberals	despite	their	national	eclipse.	This
phenomenon	saved	the	party	in	the	1950s	and	provided	a	baseline	for	the	Liberal	revival	of	the	1970s	under	the
banner	of	Community	Politics.	Crucially,	the	freedom	to	vary	appeal	to	voters	on	local	agendas	allowed	the	Liberal
Democrats	to	be	different	in	different	locations.	Nick	Harvey,	then	MP	for	Jeremy	Thorpe’s	old	fiefdom	of	North
Devon	–	and	the	party’s	sole	Eurosceptic	MP	–	and	the	particularization	of	the	geography	of	the	vote	in	the	1990s
allowed	the	Liberal	Democrats	to	prosper	in	farming	and	fishing	communities	despite	–	not	because	of	–	the	party’s
European	policy.
Needless	to	say,	the	2015	and	2017	elections	demonstrated	how	hard	the	party	has	been	hit,	even	in	regions	of
traditional	strength.	Indeed	it	seems	the	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition	succeeded	where	the	industrial
revolution,	the	enfranchisement	of	the	working	class,	and	the	secularization	of	Britain	had	all	failed	in	wiping	out	the
Liberal	reservoirs	of	support:	in	the	Celtic	fringe,	Scottish	seats	were	lost	to	the	SNP;	Welsh	constituencies	and	those
in	the	south-west	of	England	fell	to	the	Conservatives.	And	the	English	seats	typified	by	employment	in	farming	and
fisheries	–	sometimes	a	source	of	almost	curious	Liberal	Democrat	support	–	revealed	themselves	to	be	hotbeds	of
anti-Europeanism	in	the	2016	Referendum.
Whatever	happened	to	being	the	party	of	the	48%?
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If	the	Liberal	Democrats	were	unlikely	to	re-capture	areas	of	traditional	strength	that	had	backed	Brexit,	what	about
the	chances	of	the	party	making	inroads	into	the	Remain	vote?	The	2016	Referendum	revealed	considerable	support
for	staying	in	the	EU	from	the	British	public,	and	the	main	parties	would	continue	to	find	it	difficult	to	mobilise	around
the	issue.	The	Conservatives’	clear	split	on	Europe	had	been	apparent	since	the	1990s	but	now	threatened	to
fragment	the	party	altogether,	while	Labour’s	policy	on	Brexit	was	unclear	as	some	of	their	northern	heartlands	in
particular	contained	deep	pockets	of	anti-EU	resentment.	Despite	the	apparent	difficulty	that	the	two	main	parties
faced	in	appealing	to	the	significant	Remainer	vote,	the	largest	unequivocal	Europhile	party	standing	in	all	of	Britain
failed	to	capture	a	significant	slice	of	the	48%	cake.
As	we’ve	outlined,	the	Liberal	Democrats’	poor	public	visibility	might	have	contributed	to	this	inability	to	mobilize	the
48%.	During	the	campaign,	Farron	had	been	the	only	major	party	leader	not	to	take	place	in	a	televised	debate.
Partly	the	failure	to	rally	voters	was	due	to	the	weirdly	partisan	nature	of	the	Remain	campaign	(parallel	Conservative
and	Labour	Remain	messages	rather	than	genuine	cross-party	appeals	for	unity)	but	mostly	it	contributed	to	the
strangely	subterranean	nature	of	the	profile	of	the	Liberal	Democrats	after	coalition.	It	was	both	a	symptom	and
cause	of	marginalization	on	the	very	issue	on	which	the	party	could	realistically	claim	to	be	the	most	united,	and	the
most	distinctive	in	British	politics.
The	EU	Referendum	seemed	to	hand	the	Liberal	Democrats	a	golden	chance,	a	ticket	back	to	relevance	in	British
politics	and	an	opportunity	to	capitalize	on	the	48%	of	support	for	Remain.	And	with	Theresa	May’s	internal	travails
and	an	inability	to	sell	the	Chequers	plan	to	European	leaders	in	Salzburg,	disenchantment	with	Brexit	seems	to	be
growing.	Surely	this	is	the	time	when	the	Liberal	Democrats	could	make	inroads	into	the	core	Remain	vote?
Why	the	Remain	vote	won’t	translate	into	a	Liberal	Democrat	vote
This	line	of	thinking	overlooks	some	fundamental	difficulties	for	the	party,	which	have	their	foundation	in	the	Liberal
Democrat	twin	threat	–	structure	and	agency.	The	party	isn’t	in	a	position	to	convert	latent	Remainer	support	in	much
of	the	country	and	where	it	might	be	it	is	still	failing	to	rebrand	its	image,	which	suffered	from	being	Tory-enablers
during	the	austerity	coalition.
The	48%	(and	perhaps	increasing!)	is	unlikely	to	be	made	up	from	dedicated	Europhiles.	Indeed	one	of	the	core
messages	from	the	Remain	campaign	had	been	that	the	EU	was	far	from	perfect	and	could	be	reformed.	The	vast
majority	of	British	relations	with	Europe	since	1975	had	also	been	presented	as	a	battle	against	the	more	damaging
instincts	of	Brussels	and	the	wider	European	project.	Simply	put,	the	48%	contains	a	large	residue	of	reluctant	or
contingent	support	for	the	EU	as	the	lesser	of	two	bad	options.	As	such,	it	is	unlikely	that	these	contingent	supporters
would	switch	straight	to	the	Europhile	Liberal	Democrats	just	to	exit	from	Brexit.
A	further	slice	of	the	48%	might	have	democratic	issues	with	trying	to	overturn	the	result.	There	are	likely	to	be
Remainers	who	feel	that	once	a	decision	was	reached	in	the	Referendum	it	is	necessary	to	abide	with	the	result.
This	indeed	seems	to	be	the	policy	of	much	of	the	government,	including	Mrs	May	(prior	to	Chequers	at	least).
A	third	portion	of	the	48%	is	likely	to	constitute	those	voters	who,	on	balance,	preferred	to	stay	in	the	EU	but	whose
party	politics	are	defined	by	other	issues.	It	is	possible	to	be	an	ardent	Remainer	but	also	think	that	other	issues	–
austerity,	unemployment,	health,	immigration	–	are	the	ones	that	determine	vote	choice	in	an	election	rather	than	a
binary	on/off,	in/out,	yes/no	referendum.	When	you	add	this	partisanship	to	the	contextual	difficulties	facing	the
Liberal	Democrats	(after	2015	the	party	just	isn’t	in	close	contention	in	enough	Westminster	constituencies	to	be	a
viable	choice	to	many	voters)	we	can	see	how	the	particular	incidence	of	structure	and	agency	combine	against	the
party.	The	existence	of	an	issue	in	which	the	Liberal	Democrats	might	rally	a	significant	number	of	voters	does	not
mean	that	the	Liberal	Democrats	can	rally	a	significant	number	of	voters.
For	a	party	still	coming	to	terms	with	its	reduced	relationship	with	the	British	public	after	the	coalition,	the	knowledge
that	it	is	still	toxic	to	many	of	its	former	voters	(those	borrowed	from	the	anti-Conservative	axis	of	the	centre	and
protest	leftist	voters	disillusioned	with	the	Labour	government’s	record	on	civil	liberties	and	foreign	policy),	this	is
problematic	to	say	the	least.	The	combination	of	structural	and	agency	difficulties	combine	to	make	it	almost
impossible	for	the	Liberal	Democrats	to	recover	in	the	short	term.
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Exit	from	Brexit	is	a	logical	strategy	to	pursue	right	now.	It	might	even	be	the	only	card	that	the	party	can	play	from
an	extremely	weak	hand	in	the	poker	game	of	British	politics.	However	the	strategy’s	potential	for	success	is	much
more	limited	than	might	be	initially	assumed	and	even	its	most	rabid	advocates	might	be	disinclined	to	convert	to	the
Liberal	Democrats	as	the	party	most	likely	to	achieve	it.
________
Note:	Cutts	and	Russell	are	currently	authoring	a	book	on	the	Liberal	Democrats,	provisionally	titled	“From	Despair	to
Where?”	for	Manchester	University	Press.
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